Confusion in Valuation for Public Utility Rate-Making by Rose, Joseph R.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1962
Confusion in Valuation for Public Utility Rate-
Making
Joseph R. Rose
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rose, Joseph R., "Confusion in Valuation for Public Utility Rate-Making" (1962). Minnesota Law Review. 1700.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1700
Confusion in Valuation for
Public Utility Rate-Making
There are two steps in the rate-making process for pub-
lic utilities-valuation of the public utility property in
order to ascertain a rate base and determination of a
proper rate of return. This Article concerns the first
step. Professor Rose analyzes the various concepts of
"value" as used by the states. He concludes that diversity
and confusion in valuation have resulted from a failure
to define "value" in operational terms, but that the con-
fusion can be removed by adopting uniform legislation
prescribing original cost as the rate base.
Joseph R. Rose*
The present study is designed to fill a gap in the literature on
public utility rate-making in the states by presenting a compre-
hensive review and classification of the current statutes, commis-
sion interpretations, and judicial decisions on valuation for rate-
making purposes. The purpose of this review is not merely to of-
fer a single source for reference and comparison, but to look into
the fundamental meanings that have been associated with the con-
cept of "value" in the rate-making process and to examine the
concept independently in terms of the only criterion relevant to it,
the welfare of society.
Valuation of public utility property for rate-making may be
said to have begun in 1898 with the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Smyth v. Ames.' In that case the Court
declared a constitutional requirement that rates must be calculated
to yield a fair return on the "fair value" of utility property.2
* Chairman of the Department of Transportation and Public Utilities,
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania.
The author gratefully acknowledges the exceptionally important contri-
butions to this article by Mr. Amor Gosfield, formerly of the Department
of Economics of the University of Pennsylvania. Not only did Mr. Gosfield
edit the entire manuscript with exceptional care, but he also made basic
additions to the economic analysis in Part Im.
1. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
2. The Court defined fair value as a judgment figure to be derived by the
regulatory authority after giving consideration to, inter alia, original cost of
construction, amount and market value of bonds and stock, and the earn-
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Fair value thus became the "law of the land,"3 and regulatory
authorities, with a few notable dissidents, adopted it as the rate
base. In 1944, however, the Court in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas
Co.4 removed fair value, and indeed valuation, as a constitutional
requirement. Prior to Hope valuation for rate-making was sub-
stantially uniform throughout the country, at least in principle,
despite incessant and unremitting opposition to fair value as the
rate base by advocates of original cost. After Hope regulatory
agencies proceeded to re-examine law and policy in the light of
past experience and contemporary conditions. Consequently, uni-
formity in valuation has been succeeded by the application of
a variety of valuation methods to rate-making, although fair
value has demonstrated remarkable vitality. At this date three prin-
ciples of rate-base determination prevail: fair value, original cost,
and reproduction cost.' Fair value in some form governs valuation
ing capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute.
This concept of fair value was soon modified. In 1909 the Supreme Court
held in City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (1909), that
accrued depreciation must be deducted from original and reproduction
cost in establishing fair value. In addition it was early realized that market
value of securities and earnings could not properly serve as the basis of de-
termining earnings. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 461 (1913).
Consequently, "fair value" has been often re-interpreted as a judgment
figure predicated principally upon original and reproduction costs, both
depreciated. But the original version of fair value as defined in Smyth v.
Ames still persists in some jurisdictions, as shown below.
3. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 487 (1929).
4. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). The Court in abandoning the rule of Smyth v.
Ames declared: "Rates which enable the company to operate successfully,
to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its
investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid,
even though they might produce only a meager return on the so-called 'fair
value' rate base." Id. at 605.
5. There are several versions of original cost. It ordinarily means the
actual money cost of property at the time when it was first dedicated to
the public use, whether by the present company or its predecessors. 47 C.F.R.
§ 31.01-3(x) (1958). See also American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States,
299 U.S. 232 (1936). "Prudent investment" resembles cost when first devot-
ed to public use but, as explained by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his separate
opinion in Missouri ex. rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923), the investment must have been made
"prudently." See also Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
289 U.S. 287 (1933). "Historical cost" is an estimate of prudent investment
when accounting records do not show original cost. Missouri ex rel. South-
western Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra. Cost to the utility
(other than cost when first devoted to public use) is the purchase price
paid by the accounting utility for a plant already constructed. It is usually
more than cost when first devoted, but may be less when the economic value
of the property is impaired. Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S.
548 (1945). "Book cost" denotes the amount invested in capital as stated
in the accounting records. It may be equal to, greater, or less than original
cost as above defined. In this discussion all these concepts of original cost
are treated as equivalents unless a distinction is in controversy.
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in the rate-making of 17 states,6 original cost in some form in 30
states7 and the District of Columbia, and reproduction cost in
At least two versions of reproduction cost are now in vogue. Both seek
to estimate the cost of reproducing the existing plant in service at current
prices of material and labor. The traditional concept of reproduction cost
assumes that the existing property is reconstructed as a whole in a single
continuous operation. An engineering inventory is made, a period of con-
struction is estimated, and current prices are applied to the units of property.
These may be "spot" prices as of a given date or average prices for one,
two, three, or five years. Wage rates and labor performance are also estimat-
ed. Pittsburgh v. Public Util. Comm'n, 169 Pa. Super. 400, 82 A.2d 515(1951). Since World War II trended original cost has largely replaced
estimates of reproduction cost. The practice first developed in the appli-
cation of price indices to an estimate of a reproduction cost already in
existence in order to avoid the expense of making another such estimate.
Scranton-Spring Brook Water Serv. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 119 Pa.
Super. 117, 146 (1935). Trending has now been extended to original cost by
constructing index numbers for labor and materials and applying them to
the original cost of the property as reflected in the primary accounts. The
trending is brought down to the cut-off date of the rate proceedings. Bell
Tel. Co., 16 P.U.R.3d 207 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1956).
There are important differences between a traditional estimate of re-
production cost and trended original cost. One is that the former assumes
that the property is reconstructed in a single operation and takes account of
the economies of scale, whereas the latter does not give consideration to
such economies because it is predicated on piecemeal construction. In the
ensuing text both methods are usually referred to as reproduction cost.
While it is true that differences in computing the rate base may be
neutralized by variations in the rates of return, the principal objectives of
this article are to demonstrate the unsoundness of the "value" concept and
to present a better approach to the valuation problem. Generally, dif-
ferences in the rate base are not fully compensated by variations in the
rate of return. See Returns Allowed on Fair Value Lower Than on Original
Cost, 70 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 290 (1962). For a discussion of the problems
of rates of return, see generally Freeman, An "Enlightened Judgment"
Approach to Rate of Return, 61 HI.v. L. REv. 1380 (1948).
6.
Alabama Iowa Missouri New Mexico
Arizona Kentucky Montana North Carolina
Delaware Maryland Nebraska Pennsylvania
Illinois Minnesota New Jersey Texas
Indiana
Perhaps New York should be added since its law requires fair value for
telephone rates. See notes 38-39 infra and accompanying text. It is classified
below as an original cost jurisdiction because rates of all other utilities are
based on original cost. The difficulties inherent in classification are apparent
from the discussion of the law and practice in each of the states.
7.
Arkansas Idaho New Hampshire Utah
California Kansas New York Vermont
Colorado Louisiana North Dakota Virginia
Connecticut Maine Oklahoma Washington
Florida Massachusetts Oregon West Virginia
Georgia Michigan Rhode Island Wisconsin
Hawaii Mississippi South Dakota Wyoming
Nevada Tennessee
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only one state, Ohio.8
Within this division, however, the variety of statutory enact-
ments is extensive, and there is an even greater variation in appli-
cation and judicial construction. After Hope many new statutes
were passed and old ones were often re-interpreted. Most frequently
these changes specify "value" as the basis of valuation; less often
"fair value" or "reasonable value"; and occasionally original cost or
one of its variants. Sometimes these terms are explicitly defined
in the acts, but often they are not. Some statutes that provide for
valuation fail to link it with rate-making; others expressly relate
them. Many statutes make no mention of valuation at all. Fi-
nally a number defy classification.
Judicial construction of similar legislation is markedly conflict-
ing. At one extreme courts attribute to value, however qualified,
the traditional meaning of fair value as defined in Smyth v. Ames;
other courts hold that value signifies original cost. Commissions
are more consistent and usually interpret legislation, regardless
of terminology, to permit original cost to be used as the rate base
unless enjoined by the courts of their jurisdictions to use some
version of value or fair value.
The purpose of valuation is the same in all jurisdictions-to es-
tablish the base to which the allowable rate of return is applied in
order to ascertain the allowable return. The allowable return, of
course, is the cost of capital. In economic principle there can be
no justification for regionally diverse valuation principles, especial-
ly in view of the fact that public utilities, wherever situated, seek
capital in the same money markets of the nation. Since diversity
in the concept of valuation can serve no useful end, it follows that
the multifarious legislation and interpretations are evidence of con-
fusion and not of valid differences of circumstance or purpose.
The provenance of the confusion is in the concept of "value" it-
Alaska and South Carolina are not classified. The Alaska Public Service
Commission Act of 1959, ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 49-8 (1959), creat-
ed a commission but no cases have been reported in Public Utilities Reports.
Similarly, no South Carolina proceedings involving valuation were reported
in these reports for the period under survey. The South Carolina act reg-
ulating electric utilities empowers the Commission to fix just and reasonable
rates and to "fix the value of the . . . property of any public utility."
S.C. CODE §§ 24-31, 24-115 (1952). The statute governing telephone rates
has similar provisions. S.C. CODE § 58-423 (1952). The law relating to
other utilities authorizes the Commission to prescribe reasonable rates but
contains no valuation provisions. S.C. CODE § 58-1 (1952).
8. City of Cleveland v. Public Util. Comm'n, 164 Ohio St. 442, 132
N.E.2d 216 (1956); City of Columbus v. Public Util. Comm'n, 154 Ohio
St. 107, 93 N.E.2d 693 (1950); East Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n,
133 Ohio St. 212, 12 N.E.2d 765 (1938); OHio REv. CODE § 4909.05
(Anderson 1953).
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self. This protean term has had perhaps more meanings attributed
to it than any other word in the language. A review of state and
federal law governing valuation reveals (1) almost endless diver-
sity in the statutory meanings and provisions ascribed to "value";
(2) the non-operational character of the concept of "value" as
defined in rate-making; and (3) a failure to distinguish between
"value" and "cost" as these terms are used in economic analysis.
I. DIVERSITY IN LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION
Six categories may be distinguished among the statutory enact-
ments of the states relating to valuation and rates. Four ex-
pressly include "value" as the basis of valuation, but differ among
themselves in that "value" is either (1) defined and associated
with rates,9 (2) undefined but associated with rates, (3) defined
but unassociated with rates, or (4) undefined and unassociated
with rates. A fifth category associates original cost with rates, and
the sixth merely provides that rates shall be reasonable without
mention of valuation.
A. VALUE DEFINED AND ASSOCIATED WITH RATES
The most unequivocal provisions explicitly associating value and
rate-making appear in the legislative enactments of Alabama,
North Carolina, Kentucky, New Mexico, and Minnesota. The Ala-
bama statute states that rates shall yield a fair return on "reason-
able value";"0 those of North Carolina,' Kentucky,' and New
Mexico' specify a fair return on "value"; the Minnesota act,
making no mention of either term, directs the Commission to con-
sider original cost and "current value" in determining the rate
base.' "Fair value" and "value" in all of these statutes (except
that of Minnesota) are defined as requiring consideration of origi-
9. That is, rates are explicitly required to yield a fair return on the
"value" of property used or useful in the public service.
10. ALA. CODE tit. 48, § § 52, 319 (1958).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-124 (1950).
12. Ky. REv. STAT. § 278.290 (1962).
13. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-5-14 (1953). New Mexico has two agencies
exercising regulatory control of public utilities: the State Corporation Com-
mission, created by the state constitution from which it derives its authority;
and the Public Service Commission, which operates under the New Mexico
Public Utility Act. The latter body has jurisdiction over electric, gas, water,
and steam public utilities. The former regulates common carriers such as
railway, express, telephone, telegraph, and sleeping car companies. Policy
under the state constitution, which differs from the Public Utility Act in
respect to rate principles, is discussed in text accompanying notes 110-13
infra.
14. MiNN. STAT. § 237.08 (1961). See note 125 infra and accompanying
text.
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nal cost and reproduction cost and therefore are the equivalent of
the traditional concept of "fair value."
In Alabama and North Carolina the commissions construed the
acts as permitting the use of original cost as the rate base, but were
reversed by their supreme courts, which held that reproduction
cost must also be given consideration.' 5 On remand the Alabama
Commission found "reasonable value" by attributing two-thirds
weight to original cost and one-third to reproduction cost.' The
policy of the North Carolina Commission in computing "value"
varies, but it seems to include original cost as the principal coin-
ponent. 7 In Kentucky the Commission determined the rate base
primarily as original cost, and the highest court of the state af-
firmed by declaring that the rate of return applied by the Commis-
sion to original cost had been calculated to yield an adequate total
return, and that if a higher rate base had been adopted by con-
sideration of reproduction cost, a lower rate of return would have
been justified.' It indicated that it would not disturb rates de-
signed to produce adequate earnings even when reproduction cost
was not given "due consideration." The policy of the Kentucky
Commission on valuation varies so much as not to be subject to
generalization. 9 In New Mexico the act has not been interpreted
15. Alabama: Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
268 Ala. 312, 106 So. 2d 163 (1958), opinion extended, 269 Ala. 361,
113 So. 2d 503 (1959). North Carolina: State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v.
State, 239 N.C. 333, 80 S.E.2d 133 (1954); see State ex rel. Utilities
Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C. 536, 119 S.E.2d 469
(1961).
16. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 254 (Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 36 P.U.R.3d 381 (Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1960); Alabama Gas Corp., 25 P.U.R.3d 257 (Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1958).
17. No cases decided by the North Carolina Commission have appeared
in Public Utilities Reports since State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Piedmont
Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C. 536, 119 S.E.2d 469 (1961). Original cost
seems to have been the principal factor in finding fair value in the following
proceedings prior to that decision: Public Serv. Co., 33 P.U.R.3d 398(N.C. Util. Comm'n 1960); Carolina Water Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 462
(N.C. Util. Comm'n 1960); Mebane Home Tel. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 222
(N.C. Util. Comm'n 1959); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 7 P.U.R.3d
43 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1954). But in Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 25 P.U.R.
3d 346 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1958), the Commission found fair value as the
average of original and reproduction costs.
18. Citizens Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 247 S.W.2d 510
(Ky. 1952); cf. City of Covington v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 313 S.W.2d 391
(Ky. 1958).
19. The Commission sometimes employs original cost and adds an incre-
ment for the "depressing effect of increasing plant." Columbia Gas, Inc.,
36 P.U.R.3d 401 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959); Kentucky Util. Co.,
22 P.U.R.3d 113, 119 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958); Western Ky. Gas
Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 394 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957); Southern Bell Tel.
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by the state supreme court. The Commission in recent proceedings
has proclaimed its adherence to fair value, but it has used original
cost as the basic element and added to it an increment to com-
pensate for higher present cost. 2° Valuation under the Minnesota
law has not been in controversy before the Minnesota Supreme
Court; the Commission has held that "current value" as set forth
in the statute denotes reproduction cost and that fair value is the
measure of the rate base.21 It has given equal weight to original
cost and reproduction cost in finding fair value.--
& Tel. Co., 18 P.U.R.3d 113 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957). At other
times it adopts original cost without adjustment. United Fuel Gas Co.,
8 P.U.RL3d 340 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 98 P.U.R. (n.s.) 511 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953); Kentucky Tel.
Corp., 97 P.U.R. (n.s.) 105 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952). In still other
proceedings the Commission relates allowable earnings to original cost,
reproduction cost, and capital structure separately. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 18 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1954); Western Ky. Gas Co.,
98 P.U.R. (n.s.) 90 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953); Union Light, Heat
& Power Co., 97 P.U.R. (n.s.) 33 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953). In
Louisville Transit Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 289 (Ky. Dep't of Motor Transp.
1956), the rates of a transit company were prescribed on the basis of the
operating ratio by the Kentucky Department of Motor Transportation in
accordance with Ky. REv. SrAT. § 281.600 (1962).
20. Vernah S. Moyston, 29 P.U.R.3d 526 (N.M. Pub. Srv. Comm'n
1959); Ray Edington, 20 P.U.R.3d 436 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957);
Jal Gas Co., 20 P.U.R.3d 77 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957); Lea County
Gas Co., 10 P.U.R.3d 279 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955); Mesilla Park
Water Works Co., 8 P.U.R.3d 192 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955); Happy
Valley Waterworks, 7 P.U.R.3d 300 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1954).
In Walter S. Ray, 17 P.U.R.3d 413 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957),
the Commission accepted original cost as the rate base but compensated
for present cost in fixing the rate of return. In Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co.,
15 P.U.R.3d 357 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956), the Commission adopted
original cost in similar circumstances, declaring that the "rate base was
computed in accordance with the practice which the commission custo-
marily has employed . . . ."Id. at 360. In Southern Union Gas Co., 36
P.U.R.3d 60 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960), however, the Commission
used conventional fair value, giving somewhat greater weight to repro-
duction than to original cost.
21. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 267, 271 (Minn. R.R. &
Warehouse Comm'n 1958).
22. Id. at 274. Cf. Pioneer No. Tel. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 91 (Minn. R.R. &
Warehouse Comm'n 1959); Akeley Tel. Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 415 (Minn. R.R.
& Warehouse Comm'n 1958). See also Blue Earth Valley Tel. Co., 37
P.U.R.3d 311 (Minn. R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n 1960).
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B. VALUE UNDEFINED AND ASSOCIATED WITH RATES
Legislation in eight states-Texas," Maryland,24 Washing-
ton, 5 Michigan,26 Mississippi,27  Kansas,28  New York,2" and
Wyoming3°-expressly includes "value" as the rate base and links
it to rate making,3' but does not define it. The statutes of the first
four states specify "fair value," those of Mississippi and Kansas
"reasonable value," and those of New York and Wyoming "value."
The commissions in Texas and Maryland found "value" by
taking original cost as the basic factor and adding an increment
to it, apparently to compensate for reproduction cost, instead of
giving consideration to reproduction cost as such. The Texas Su-
preme Court reversed such a finding, declaring that fair value
should be determined "as a reasonable balance" between original
cost and reproduction cost,32 while the Maryland Supreme Court
affirmed its Commission's finding.33 The Washington 4 and Mich-
23. Tax. REv. Cv. STAT. art. 1124 (1953).
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 69 (1957).
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 80.04.250 (1962).
26. MicH. COMP. LAWS §§ 460.551-59 (1948). The act relating to
water power companies has similar provisions. MICH. STAT. ANN. §
22.1673 (Supp. 1961). No cases were discovered involving rates of such
companies. The act governing natural gas rates states that they shall be
based, among other considerations, on the cost of natural gas. MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 22.13(6b)(Supp. 1961). The Commission uses original cost as
the rate base. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 289 (Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1960). The act applicable to telephone rates provides merely
that rates shall be reasonable. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 22.1443 (Supp. 1961).
Under this act the Commission employs original cost.
27. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 7716-08, 7716-11 (1942).
28. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-128 (1949).
29. N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 97. Other sections of the law applicable to
other utilities are treated in text accompanying note 98 infra.
30. WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-21, 37-51 (1959).
31. That is the legislation expressly provides that rates shall yield a
fair or reasonable return on value.
32. Railroad Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502,
289 S.W.2d 559 (1956). See also General Tel. Co. v. City of Wellington,
156 Tex. 238, 294 S.W.2d 385 (1956). For recent treatment of valuation
by the Texas Commission see Texas Southeastern Gas Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 413
(Tex. R.R. Comm'n 1959); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.3d
130 (El Paso, Tex., City Council 1956).
33. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 201 Md.
170, 93 A.2d 249 (1952). See also City of Hagerstown v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 217 Md. 101, 141 A.2d 699 (1958); Baltimore Transit Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 206 Md. 533, 112 A.2d 687 (1955). The Com-
mission clearly favors original cost. Baltimore Transit Co., 37 P.U.R.3d I
(Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961); Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co., 15
P.U.R.3d 475 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956); Cumberland & Allegheny
Gas Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 25 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1954). It has on occasion
allowed an increment above original cost to compensate for inflation. Balti-
more Gas & Elec. Co. v. McQuaid, 220 Md. 373, 152 A.2d 825 (1959).
On other occasions it has allowed for inflation in fixing the allowable rate
of return. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 38 P.U.R.3d 67 (Md. Pub. Serv.
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igane commissions employ original cost as the rate base, but the
issue has not been before their courts in recent years.
The commissions of both Mississippi and Kansas construed
"reasonable value" as permitting use of original cost. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court approved this interpretation of the law,"
while in Kansas there has been no recent pronouncement on the
issue by an appellate court."
In New York the Commission adopted original cost as the
measure of "value," but was reversed by the New York Court of
Appeals, which held that "value" differs from cost and that the
act obligated the Commission "to receive proof of reproduction
cost less depreciation as some evidence of present value ....
Upon remand the Commission admitted evidence of reproduction
cost and declared that the evidence demonstrated marked infla-
tion in construction and labor costs so that replacement of the
company's plant would cost more than when it was built. It con-
cluded, however, that from the evidence it could not ascertain with
Comm'n 1961) It has also added an increment to original cost for "attrition
of earnings." "Attrition" means inability to earn the allowable return because
of the installation of additional plant at unit prices in excess of the unit
price of the system as a whole. Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co., 36
P.U.R.3d 321 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 321 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958). The subject is
analyzed in note 146 infra.
34. Pacific Tel & Tel. Co., 25 P.U.R.3d 18 (Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1958). Original cost was supported by the Washington Supreme Court even
before Hope in State ex rel. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub.
Serv., 19 Wash. 2d 200, 142 P.2d 498 (1943). See also Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co. 85 P.U.1R (ns.) 204, 216 (Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1949). Recent
Commission proceedings are: Northwest Natural Gas Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 355
(Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); General Tel. Co., 30 P.U.R.3d 145
(Wash. Pub. Serv. Conm'n 1959); West Coast Tel. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 238(Wash. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959).
35. Consumers Power Co., 38 P.U.R.3d 355 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1961); Consumers Power Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 133 (Mich. Pub. Serm. Comm'n
1959).
36. The Mississippi Commission, with the approval of the supreme court
of the state, consistently rejects reproduction cost as lacking in probative
value. United Gas Corp. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 240 Miss. 405,
127 So. 2d 404 (1961); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Mississippi Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 237 Miss. 157, 113 So. 2d 622 (1959). See also Mississippi
Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Home Tel. Co., 236 Miss. 444, 110 So. 2d 618(1959).
37. United Tel. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 128 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1958).
In Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 257 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n
1960), the Commission adopted original cost, but on appeal by the utility
company the Kansas district court referee reversed, holding that the statute
requires a valuation reflecting current economic conditions. Nat'l Ass'n
RtR. & Util. Comm'rs, Bull. No. 8-1961, Jan. 25, 1961.
38. New York Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 309 N.Y. 569, 579,
132 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1956).
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exactness what replacement cost would be, and therefore it used
original cost as the rate base, making adjustment for inflation in
the rate of return.39 The Wyoming Supreme Court construed the
act as binding the Commission to no particular formula in selecting
a rate base,40 and the Commission uses original cost.4
C. VALUE DEFINED BUT UNASSOCIATED WITH RATES
Statutes in five jurisdictions-Delaware,42 Indiana,43 Georgia,"
the District of Columbia,45 and Nebraska 46-provide for "fair
value" or "value" as the basis of valuation and define the terms,
but do not relate rates to valuation. The Delaware and Indiana
acts specify "fair value," while Georgia's act empowers the Com-
mission to ascertain the "cost of construction" and the "present
value" of utility property. The District statute directs the Commis-
sion to ascertain and consider the amount of money expended
for construction and the "replacement value" of public utility fa-
cilities. The Nebraska law makes it the "duty of the . . . Com-
mission to ascertain . . . the physical value of each . . . pub-
lic service corporation in this state . . . ." and appears to define
such value as reproduction cost.
39. New York Tel. Co., 20 P.U.R.3d 129 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1957). In Rochester Tel. Co., 24 P.U.R.3d 262 (N.Y. State Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1958), the Commission made an allowance for "attrition" in the
allowable rate of return.
40. Natural Gas Consumers v. Northern Util. Co., 70 Wyo. 225, 247
P.2d 767 (1952).
41. Silver Star Tel. Co., 39 P.U.R.3d 386 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1961); Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 202, (Wyo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1960); Wyoming Gas Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 60, (Wyo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1959); Northern Util. Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 24 (Wyo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1959); Black Hills Power & Light Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 598 (Wyo.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959); United Tel. Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 68 (Wyo. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1958).
South Dakota may also be included in the category of states that associate
value with rate-making, although the statute makes no mention of value.
It simply authorizes the Commission "to make a physical valuation of all
the property of any telegraph or telephone company . . . when such valua-
tion is necessary for the purpose of arriving at any determination in con-
nection with the regulation of its business or the adjustment of its rates."
S.D. CODE § 52.0269 (1939). The South Dakota Supreme Court appears
to have construed the act to permit use of original cost as the rate base.
See Application of Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 78 S.D. 15, 98 N.W.2d 170
(1959). The Commission employs original cost. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
36 P.U.R.3d 67 (S.D. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 126 (1953).
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 54-203 (1951).
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 93-308 (1958).
45. D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-305 (1961).
46. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 75-803-805 (1958).
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The Delaware law states that the Commission in determining
fair value may take account of original cost and reproduction cost.
When the Delaware Commission ascertained fair value without re-
vealing the precise manner in which it arrived at its finding, the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission
must demonstrate consideration of both original cost and repro-
duction cost.' In subsequent proceedings the Commission fixed
fair value at the approximate average of these two factors.4 s The
Indiana act requires the Commission to consider original cost in
determining fair value while providing that it may consider repro-
duction cost. At first the Commission did not consistently adhere
to fair value, 9 but more recently the Indiana Supreme Court de-
clared that fair value is the rate base under the law,' and the
Commission now gives weight to both original cost and reproduc-
tion cost.5' It is impossible, however, to discover from the Com-
mission's findings of fair value any consistency in the relative
weights it attributes to each of these factors.52
The valuation issue has not been before the Georgia courts re-
cently, and the Commission employs original cost without devia-
tion. 3 The District statute was interpreted by the United States
47. In the Matter of Diamond State Tel. Co., 48 Del. (9 Terry) 497,
107 A.2d 786 (1954), affd on rehearing, 49 Del. (10 Terry) 203, 113 A.2d
437 (1955).
48. Diamond State Tel. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 121 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1959); Diamond State Tel. Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 417 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1958), rev'd in part on other grounds, 51 Del. (1 Storey) 525, 149 A.2d
324 (1959).
49. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 441, 446 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1954); Kokomo Water Works Co., 86 P.U.R. (ns.) 249, 254 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1950).
50. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 235 Ind. 1, 15, 130
N.E.2d 467, 473 (1955). See also Public Serv. Comm'n v. City of Indian-
apolis, 235 Ind. 70, 95, 131 N.E.2d 308, 318 (1956). In an earlier proceed-
ing the Indiana Supreme Court had said that "the statute is broad enough
to permit the commission... to utilize... the reproduction costs at current
prices . .. in order to determine present fair value." Public Serv. Comm'n
v. Indianapolis Ry., 225 Ind. 656, 662, 76 N.E.2d 841, 843-44 (1948).(Emphasis added.)
51. In Southern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 38 P.U.R.3d 177 (Ind. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1960), the Commission appeared to give approximately equal
weight to original cost and reproduction cost.
52. In the following proceedings original cost was given substantially
greater weight in the Commission's finding of fair value: Public Serv. Co.,
37 P.U.R.3d 485 (ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961); Indiana Gas & Water
Co., 37 P.U.R.3d 449 (ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961); Central Ind. Gas
Co., 37 P.U.R.3d 138 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960).
53. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 432 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1960); Douglas Tel. Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 234 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960);
United Cities'Gas Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 173 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959);
.id-Georgia Natural Gas Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 356 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
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Court of Appeals for the District Circuit as not compelling the
use of any particular method of valuation, 4 and the Commission
employs original cost.5" The Nebraska act has not been con-
strued by the courts; 6 the Commission sometimes adopts original
cost as the rate base,57 and at other times it takes account of
reproduction cost.5"
D. VALUE UNDEFINED AND UNASSOCIATED WITH RATES
The most common regulatory provisions, found in 15 states, in-
clude "fair value" or "value" as the basis of valuation, but nei-
ther define these terms nor associate them with rate making.
Statutes in Massachusetts59 and Pennsylvania"0 and the Arizona
1959); General Tel. Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 452 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959);
Savannah Transit Co., 11 P.U.R.3d 380 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955);
Gas Light Co., 8 P.U.R.3d 487 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1955). Prior to
Hope fair value was the rate base in Georgia. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 164 Ga. 822, 139 S.E. 725 (1927); City of Atlanta
v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 149 Ga. 405, 100 S.E. 439 (1919). For a com-
prehensive review of valuation in Georgia see Clayton, "Public Utility
Regulation in Georgia," ch. II, 1959 (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania).
54. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 158 F.2d 521
(D.C. Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 816 (1947). See its companion
case, United States v. Public Util. Comm'n, 158 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
See also Capital Transit Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 213 F.2d 176, 184-85
(1954).
55. Spiegel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 226 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 904 (1955); cf. Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 324
U.S. 548 (1945). In District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 25 P.U.R.3d
371 (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comn'n 1958), the Commission averaged original
cost and purchase price in fixing the rate base. Under Act of July 24, 1956,
ch. 669, § 4, 70 Stat. 598, the Commission is authorized to use the operat-
ing ratio in prescribing transit fares. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc.,
38 P.U.R.3d 19 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1961). In other than transit eases,
the Commission adheres to original cost. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 28
P.U.R.3d 206 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959); Washington Gas Light Co..
24 P.U.R.3d 417 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958); Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 6 P.U.R.3d 222 (D.C. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1954).
56. The Nebraska Supreme Court has declared in dicta that "reasonable
value" is the rate base without defining it. Oakdale Tel. Co. v. Wilgocki,
171 Neb. 425, 106 N.W.2d 486 (1960); Skeedee Independent Tel. Co. v.
Farm Bureau, 166 Neb. 49, 54, 87 N.W.2d 715, 719 (1958).
57. Panhandle Tel. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 206 (Neb. Ry. Comm'n 1959);
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 5 P.U.R.3d 24 (Neb. Ry. Comm'n 1954);
Cozad Mut. Tel. Co., 100 P.U.R. (n.s.) 31 (Neb. Ry. Comm'n 1953).
58. Cuming County Independent Tel. Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 607 (Neb.
Ry. Comm'n 1960); General Tel. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 306 (Neb. Ry. Comm'n
1959); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 19 P.U.R.d 233 (Neb. Ry. Comm'n
1957).
59. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 159, § 26 (1959). This section applies to
common carriers including telephone and telegraph companies. MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 164, § 94 (1959), relates to gas and electric companies; it does
not mention valuation, but merely directs the Commission to fix just and
reasonable rates.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1151 (1959).
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Constitution61 specify "fair value," while provisions in llinois,6
Montana,' New Jersey,64 California,6" Wisconsin," Utah," Ark-
ansas,68 Idaho,69 Colorado,"° Oklahoma,' Nevada, 2 and Ore-
gon73 mention "value."'
In Massachusetts the Commission's traditional policy of using
original cost as the rate base has recently received the approval of
the Supreme Judicial Court."4 On the other hand, an attempt
by the Pennyslvania Commission to adopt original cost was thwart-
ed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which required tradition-
al fair value, '5 and fair value is deeply imbedded in Pennsyl-
vania practice.76 The relative weight given by the Pennsylvania
61. AIz. CONST. art. 15, §§ 3, 14. The public utility law cmpowers the
Commission to fix reasonable rates and to establish valuation for public
utility property. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-203, 251, 361 (1956). It
specifies no method of valuation.
62. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 30 (1961).
63. MoNT. RFv. CoDFs ANN. § 70-106 (1947).
64. N.J. REv. STAT. § 48:2-19 (1937).
65. CAL. PUB. UTm. CODE § 1351.
66. Wis. STAT. § 196.05 (1959).
67. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 54-4-21 (1953).
68. ARK. STAT. § 73-218(4) (1947).
69. IDARo CODE ANN. § 61-523 (1947).
70. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 115-4-10 (1953).
71. OKxLA. STAT. tit. 17, § 152 (1961).
72. NEV. REv. STAT. § 704.440 (1961).
73. ORE. REv. STAT. § 757.055 (1961).
74. Use of original cost by the Massachusetts' regulatory agency goes
back at least to 1914. Middlesex & Boston Rate Case, I Second Ann. Rep.,
Mass. Pub. Serv. Comm'n C. 99, 111, 112 (1914). See also New Eng. Tel.
& Tel. CO., 1925E P.U.R. 739, 745. Yet it did not receive judicial approval
until recently. Cambridge Elec. Light Co. v. Department of Pub. Util.,
333 Mass. 536, 131 N.E.2d 922 (1956); New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Department of Pub. Util., 331 Mass. 604, 121 N.E.2d 896 (1954). The
valuation issue was not raised in New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department
of Pub. Util., 327 Mass. 81, 88, 89, 97 N.E.2d 509, 513, 514 (1951), nor
in Lowell Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 324 Mass. 80, 94-96, 84
N.E.2d 811, 820 (1949). For recent Commission decisions employing
original cost, see Boston Edison Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 321 (Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Util. 1959); New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 470 (Mass. Dep't of
Pub. Util. 1958); Boston Consol. Gas Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 401 (Mass. Dep't
of Pub. Util. 1956). But the Commission took account of "attrition" in New
Eng. Tel. &-Tel. Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 580 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Util. 1955).
In fixing transit fares the Commission makes use of the operating ratio.
Dedham-Needham Transit Lines, Inc., 18 P.U.R.3d 71 (Mass. Dep't of
Pub. Util. 1957); Massachusetts N.E. Transp. Co., 14 P.U.R.3d 293 (Mass.
Dep't of Pub. Util. 1956).
75. Solar Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 137 Pa. Super. 325, 9
A.2d 447 (1939).
76. Scranton Steam Heat Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 194 Pa. Super.
143, 167 A.2d 693 (1960); Pittsburgh v. Public Util. Comm'n, 187 Pa.
Super. 341, 144 A.2d 648 (1958); Riverton Consol. Water Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 186 Pa. Super. 1, 140 A.2d 114 (1958).
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Commission to original cost and reproduction cost varies.7 In
Arizona when the Commission computed the rate base on original
cost plus an increment ostensibly calculated to reflect the influence
of reproduction cost, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
Commission's order, but declared that reproduction cost as such
must be considered in a finding of fair value as well as original
cost.7" The Commission, following the court's mandate, attributes
equal weight to each of these elements.7 9
The supreme courts of Illinois, Montana, and New Jersey con-
strue value as signifying "fair value." The first two attribute to
"value" the traditional meaning of fair value, while the third per-
mits a modified version of it. The Illinois8" and Montana8 com-
missions both adopted original cost under the acts but were re-
77. In Scranton Steam Heat Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 194 Pa. Super.
143, 152, 167 A.2d 693, 698 (1960), the court said: "[Tihe commission
has been inclined to establish fair value at a point near the average of original
cost depreciated and reproduction cost depreciated." In fact, the Com-
mission's practice is not consistent. The Commission not only accepts original
cost in evidence, but also accepts various estimates of trended original cost
based on spot prices, three-year average prices, and five-year average prices.
It often fails to make a specific finding of reproduction cost, merely assert-
ing that it gives consideration to all the evidence. For example, in Borough
of Pen Argyl v. Blue Mountain Consol. Water Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 72 (1960),
the Commission found deficiencies in the estimates of reproduction cost, but
made no finding of it. It determined fair value at a sum close to original cost,
but at the same time gave substantial weight to the estimates of reproduction
cost. In Philadelphia Transp. Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 113 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1960), the Commission made findings of reproduction cost at spot prices
and at three-year average prices as well as original cost. Again it expressed
some dissatisfaction with the estimates of reproduction cost and used original
cost as the principal factor. In Riverton Consol. Water Co. v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 186 Pa. Super. 1, 140 A.2d 114 (1958), the Commission made
findings of original cost, reproduction cost at spot prices, reproduction cost
on three-year average prices, and reproduction cost on five-year average
prices. The finding of fair value approximated the average of original cost
and the estimate of reproduction cost at three-year average prices, which
was the median estimate of reproduction cost.
78. The court said that the Commission is entitled to determine the
"probative force" of estimates of reproduction cost and that "no set, rigid
formula is required to be used," but if supported by "legitimate evidence,"
reproduction cost "must be allowed to influence the rate base in some
degree." Simms v. Round Valley Light & Power Co., 80 Ariz. 145, 153-54,
294 P.2d 378, 383-84 (1956). See also Arizona Corp. Comm'n v. Arizom,
Water Co., 85 Ariz. 198, 335 P.2d 412 (1959).
79. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 7 P.U.R.3d 115 (Ariz. Corp.
Comm'n 1954).
80. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 414 I11. 275,
111 N.E.2d 329 (1953). See also Milford v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
20 Ill. 2d 556, 170 N.E.2d 576 (1960); Chicago v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 4 111. 2d 554, 123 N.E.2d 500 (1955).
81. State ex rel. O1sen v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 131 Mont. 272, 309
P.2d 1035 (1957); State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 131 Mont.
104. 308 P.2d 633 (1957).
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versed by their courts. The Illinois Commission now gives three-
quarters weight to original cost and one-quarter to reproduction
cost in finding "value," and the state supreme court has affirmed
this practice.12 The Montana Commission has admittedly follow-
ed an inconsistent policy in respect of weighting the two ele-
ments.' In New Jersey the Commission gives consideration to re-
production cost, but generally finds that it is entitled to little cre-
dence and either accepts original cost as the measure of "value"'
or adds an insignificant sum to reflect reproduction cost." Such
findings of "value" have been affirmed by the state supreme
court.
8 6
The remaining states in this category employ original cost as
the measure of value. In California, Wisconsin, Utah, Arkansas,
and Oklahoma this use of original cost has met with judicial ap-
proval. The California and the Massachusetts commissions follow-
ed original cost even when Smyth v. Ames was the "law of the
land," and they assumed a major role in eliminating "fair value"
as a constitutional requirement by successfully defending rate or-
ders based on original cost before the Supreme Court of the United
States." Recently the California Commission has on occasion in-
creased the rate of return to compensate for "attrition, ' but in
82. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 19
Ill. 2d 436, 167 N.E.2d 414 (1960); Alton v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
19 Ill. 2d76, 165 N.E.2d 513 (1960).
83. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 135 Mont.
170, 338 P.2d 1044 (1959); General Tel. Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 484 (Mont.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 P.U.R.3d
417, 431 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960).
84. Washington Water Co., 39 P.U.R.3d 60 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util.
Comm'rs 1961); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 135 (NJ. Bd.
of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1960); Laurel Springs Water Works Co., 35 P.U.R.
3d 470 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1960); Monmouth Consol. Water
Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 346 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1960).
85. Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Come'rs, 57
NJ. Super. 158, 154 A.2d 201 (App. Div. 1959); Hackensack Water Co. v.
Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 57 N.J. Super. 180, 154 A.2d 212 (App. Div.
1959); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 453 (N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util.
Comm'rs 1959), on remand from State v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 30
N.J. 16, 152 A.2d 35 (1959).
86. Id. at 30, 152 A.2d at 43. For construction of the New Jersey act
requiring fair value, see New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub.
Util., 12 N.J. 568, 97 A.2d 602 (1953).
87. Railroad Comm'n v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1938);
Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S. 287 (1933).
The California Supreme Court embraced the Hope doctrine in Market
St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 378, 150 P.2d 196, affd, 324 U.S.
548 (1945).
88. General Tel. Co., 25 P.U.R.3d 129 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 48 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957);
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 15 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957);
Southern Cal. Gas Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957). In
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general it has adhered to original cost. 9 The Wisconsin Com-
mission was also an early advocate of original cost. Prior to Hope
the state supreme court at first approved this policy," but later
required fair value;9 after Hope the court reaffirmed its al-
legiance to original cost.2 The Utah Commission accepted origi-
nal cost soon after Hope, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed
in an unusually comprehensive and penetrating opinion. 3 Ex-
perience in Arkansas parallels that in Utah, except that the Ar-
kansas version of original cost is cost to the utility.% In Okla-
proceedings involving fares of transit companies, the Commission utilizes
the operating ratio as well as original cost. San Diego Transit Sys., 24
P.U.R.3d 175 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958); Los Angeles Transit Lines,
20 P.U.R.3d 517 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957).
When the economic value of utility property had been destroyed because
of decline in the demand for its services, the Commission adopted the price
at which the owner offered to sell the property as the rate base. Market St.
Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 378, 150 P.2d 196, ajj'd, 324 U.S.
548 (1945).
89. The California cases are legion. A few recent ones are Pacific
Lighting Gas Supply Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 340 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960);
Southern Cal. Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 300 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960);
Southwest Gas Corp., 31 P.U.R.3d 5 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 517 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959);
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 209 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958).
90. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 183
Wis. 96, 99, 197 N.W. 359, 360-61 (1924). The history of Wisconsin's
valuation law is summarized in Wisconsin Tel. Co., 93 P.U.R. (n.s.) 490,
497 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952).
91. Waukesha Gas & Elec. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 191 Wis. 565,
211 N.W. 760 (1927).
92. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
268 Wis. 573, 68 N.W.2d 552 (1955). The court approved using purchase
price, which was considerably below original cost, as the measure of pru-
dent investment and as the rate base. Following Hope the Wisconsin Com-
mission prescribed rates without reference to any rate base, but the su-
preme court of the state reversed, holding some rate base to be necessary.
Commonwealth Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 Wis. 481, 32 N.W.2d
247 (1948). Recent Wisconsin cases demonstrating application of original
cost or prudent investment are General Tel. Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 497 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); Wisconsin So. Gas Co., 24 P.U.R.3d 378 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958); Wisconsin Tel. Co., 24 P.U.R.3d 314 (Wis. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1958). Allowance for attrition was made in rate of return in
Northern States Power Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 245 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1957).
93. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 107 Utah 155,
152 P.2d 542 (1944). Commission proceedings include Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 321 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); Midland
Tel. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 30 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958); Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 125 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1958).
In Salt Lake City Lines, 30 P.U.R.3d 319 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1959), the Commission employed both original cost and the operating ratio
to test the reasonableness of transit fares.
94. Acme Brick Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 227 Ark. 436, 299
S.W.2d 208 (1957); City of Ft. Smith v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 220
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homa the supreme court held that no single formula has to be
followed in rate-making5 and thus left the Commission free to
use original cost.9" The valuation statutes in Idaho, Colorado,
Nevada, and Oregon have not been definitively construed by the
courts in the period after Hope; the commissions in all these states
employ original cost as the rate base."
I
Ark. 70, 247 S.W.2d 474 (1952). See also Arkansas Power & Light Co. v.
Public Serv. Comn'n, 226 Ark. 225, 289 S.W.2d 668 (1956). Commission
decisions include Arkansas Power & Light Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 1, 20 (Ark.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 97 P.U.R. (n.s.)
67 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Coim'n 1952).
95. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 204 Okla. 225, 230, 230 P.2d
260, 266 (1951).
96. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 149 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n
1958); Western Light & Tel. Co., 17 P.U.R.3d 422 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n
1957); Oklahoma Arkansas Tel. Co., 10 P.U.R.3d 168 (Okla. Corp.
Comm'n 1955).
97. In Application of Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 71 Idaho 476 233 P.2d
1024 (1951), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed an order of the Com-
mission founded on original cost, but declared that it was unnecessary to
decide whether the rule of Smyth v. Ames had been modified. See also
Petition of Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 76 Idaho 474, 284 P.2d 681
(1955), rehearing denied, 76 Idaho 474, 488, 284 P.2d 681, 688 (1955).
Commission proceedings include Washington Water Power Co., 33 P.U.R.3d
88 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960); General Tel. Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 194
(Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 22
P.U.R.3 d 490 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958).
In a leading case, Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 94 P.U.R. (n.s.) 33
(Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1952), the Colorado Commission declared that
its statutory duty was to fix rates yielding a fair return on "reasonable"
value and adopted original cost as the rate base. In subsequent proceedings
it has pursued a similar policy, but has used a year-end rate base to com-
pensate for inflation. Plateau Natural Gas Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 452 (Colo.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960),- Leadville Water Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 52 (Colo.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960); Nucla-Naturita Tel. Co., 33 P.U.R.3d 278
(Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960).
In Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 70 Nev. 25, 253 P.2d 602
(1953), the utility accepted "net book" as the rate base, which was less
than either "original cost" or "current cost," and the Nevada Supreme Court
declared that valuation was not in issue. Commission proceedings include
Ely Light & Power Co., 39 P.U.R.3d 461 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961);
Henderson Tel. Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 458 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960);
Bell Tel. Co., 18 P.U.R.3d 209 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957); Henderson
Tel. Co., 4 P.U.R.3d 182 (Nev. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1953).
In Pacific Power & Light Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 36, 56 (Ore. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1960), the Commission held that the word "value" in the act
"furnishes no guide or standard as to the method or theory of its ascertain-
ment" and that the Commissioner "is free to use whatever rate-making
theory or method of valuation of property he finds will best produce the
end result of 'just and reasonable' rates." California Oregon Power Co.,
35 P.U.R.3d 328 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960); Portland Gen. Elec. Co.,
32 P.U.R.3d 497 (Ore. Pub. Util Comm'n 1960); West Coast Tel.
Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 489 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1958).
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E. ORIGINAL COST ASSOCIATED WITH RATES
Original cost or its equivalent is explicitly bound to rate-mak-
ing by statute in five states-New York, Missouri, North Dakota,
Florida, and Maine-and by the state constitution of New Mexi-
co. The New York Public Service Law provides that "in deter-
mining the price to be charged for gas or electricity the commis-
sion may consider all facts which in its judgment have any bear-
ing upon a proper determination of the question . . .with due
regard among other things to a reasonable average return upon
capital actually expended . .98 The Missouri statute is nearly
a duplicate.9 The New York Commission has consistently em-
ployed original cost since Hope; this policy is so firmly entrenched
that it has not been challenged before either the Commission or
the courts.' But when the Missouri Commission adopted origi-
nal cost under the act, the state supreme court reversed and re-
quired consideration of reproduction cost in establishing a rate
base.' Under the North Dakota act,' which unequivocally
defines "value" as "the money honestly and prudently invested,"
the Commission uses original cost0 3 and, although valuation
has not been in controversy, judicial approval has at least been
suggested.' The Florida statute governing gas and electric
98. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 72 (1951). Other sections of the New
York Public Service Law having similar provisions applicable to other utili-
ties are: § 49 (railroads, including street railways); § 63(b) (omnibus
companies); § 79 (steam corporations); § 89(j) (waterworks corporations).
99. Mo. REv. STAT. § 393.270(4) (1959).
100. Except, of course, in New York Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
309 N.Y. 569, 132 N.E.2d 847 (1956). The policy of adopting original cost
as the rate base was initiated by the New York Commission in Staten Island
Edison Corp., 60 P.U.R. (n.s.) 385, 421 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1945).
Recent Commission proceedings include Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,
35 P.U.R.3d 149 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); Consolidated Edison
Co., 96 P.U.R. (n.s.) 194 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952).
101. State ex rel. Missouri Water Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 308
S.W.2d 704 (Mo. 1957). The Commission gives substantially greater weight
to original cost than to reproduction cost in finding fair value. State ex rel.
Dyer v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Mo. 1960); Joplin
Water Works Co., 39 P.U.R.3d 504 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961);
Missouri Power & Light Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 383 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1959); St. Joseph Light & Power Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 403 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1959).
102. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-06-02 (1960).
103. Otter Tail Power Co., 38 P.U.R.3d 309 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1961); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 24 P.U.R.3d 62 (N.D. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1958).
104. Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 102 N.W.?d
329 (N.D. 1960). An earlier statute provided that rates shall yield a fair
return on the "value" of the property, but did not define "value." The state
supreme court held both prior to and after Hope that conventional fair
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rates" 5 is essentially similar to North Dakota's, and the Florida
Supreme Court has affirmed use of original cost by its Commis-
sion.106
The Maine statute is unique. It provides for "reasonable value"
as the rate base and directs the Commission to determine such
value after "due consideration to evidence of the cost of the prop-
erty when first devoted to public use, prudent acquisition cost to
the utility, less depreciation on each, and any other factors or evi-
dence material and relevant thereto but such other factors shall
not include current value."'07 The Commission construed "rea-
sonable value" as a judgment figure predicated on both original
cost when first devoted to public use and acquisition cost, the
weight to be given each factor depending upon the evidence. The
Maine Supreme Court declared that the Commission had the
duty of giving consideration to both factors and any others "ma-
terial and relevant" except "current value."'0 8 This exception
signifies clearly that reproduction cost is not an element in the
rate base.0 9
The New Mexico Constitution states that in "fixing rates of
telephone and telegraph companies, due consideration shall be
given to . . . earnings, investment and expenditure .
The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that "investment" means
value was the rate base. Northern States Power Co. v. Board of R.R.
Comm'rs, 71 N.D. 1, 298 N.W. 423 (1941); Northern States Power Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 73 N.D. 211, 13 N.W.2d 779 (1944). The present
law was enacted in 1945.
105. FLA. STAT. § 366.06 (1958). For telephone statute, see text ac-
companying note 115 infra.
106. Jacksonville Gas Corp. v. Florida R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n, 50
So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1951). Commission proceedings include Jacksonville Gas
Corp., 37 P.U.R.3d 433 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n 1961); Florida
Power & Light Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 464 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n
1960); Tampa Elec. Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 158 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1958).
107. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 44, § 18 (Supp. 2, 1961). After Hope
and prior to 1953, the statute specified fair value as the rate base, but did
not define the term. Laws of Me. 1944, ch. 400, § 16. In 1953 the act was
amended to provide "reasonable value" as the rate base and the Commission
directed to give "due consideration to evidence... [of the] cost to the utility,
current value thereof, less depreciation on each, and any other factors or
evidence material and relevant thereto." Laws of Me. 1953, ch. 377, § 2.
Interpretations of this provision include Central Me. Power Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 150 Me. 257, 109 A.2d 512 (1954), which required con-
ventional fair value.
108. Central Me. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 156 Me. 295, 311,
163 A.2d 762, 772 (1960).
109. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 489 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1958); New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 510 (Me. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1958).
110. N.M. CoNsr. art. 11, § 7.
1962]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1
the "value of the property used in the business, for rate-making
purposes, and has no reference to any particular formula."'' The
court also said that use of the word "investment" does not force
the Commission to employ original cost. It has affirmed the Com-
mission in rejecting reproduction cost as the rate base, declaring
that evidence of reproduction cost was admissible and relevant
although such cost could not under the law serve as the rate
base." 2 The Commission apparently construes the law as per-
mitting original cost as the rate base." 3
F. REASONABLE RATES UNASSOCIATED WITH VALUATION
Statutes in twelve states make no mention of valuation. Under
the eleven of them that require only that rates be just and reason-
able, the regulatory agencies use original cost as the rate base. They
may be grouped in two categories, one comprised of eight statutes
that apply to all utilities within the state" 4 and the other con-
sisting of three statutes that apply only to utilities particularly
specified."' In the remaining state, Iowa, municipalities regulate
rates pursuant to authority delegated by the state legislature, which
specifies no rule of rate-making. The Iowa Supreme Court has
held that the due process clause in the state constitution requires
fair value as the rate base."18
Under statutes in the first category, the use of original cost has
been explicitly affirmed by the courts of New Hampshire, 1 7
111. State v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 N.M. 315, 333, 224
P.2d 155, 167 (1950).
112. State Corp. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 58 N.M.
260, 274, 270 P.2d 685, 694 (1954).
113. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R.3d 176 (N.M. State
Corp. Comm'n 1954).
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-19 (1960); LA. REv. STAT.
§ 45.1163 (1950) (see also LA. CONST. art. 6, § 4); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 378:7 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 39-2-1 (1956); TENN. CODa
ANN. § 65-518 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 216 (1959); VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-35 (1959) (see also VA. CONST. art. 12, § 156(b)); W. VA. CODE
ch. 24, art. 3, § 2563 (1961).
115. FLA. STAT. 99 364.03, .14 (1958) (relating to telephone rates);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 484.103 (1948); MINN. STAT. § 221.041 (1961)
(relating to street railways). For the telephone statutes, see text accompany-
ing notes 19-22 supra.
116. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 248 Iowa
1201, 85 N.W.2d 28 (1957).
117. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 98 N.H. 211, 97 A.2d 213
(1953); accord, Public Serv. Co. v. State, 102 N.H. 66, 150 A.2d 810
(1959) (original cost as the basis of temporary rates). See generally Public
Serv. Co., 27 P.U.R.3d 113 (N.H. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959) (original cost
is cost to the utility with no allowance made for attrition); New Eng. Tel.
& Tel. Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 195, 200-01 (N.H. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1957)
(allowance made for attrition in the rate of return).
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Rhode Island,"~ and Louisiana. 19 In Vermont judicial approval
can be reasonably inferred,"0  while in Connecticut t  Vir-
ginia,' West Virginia,' 3 and Tennessee," valuation has not
118. Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Kennelly, 88 R.I. 56, 68, 143 A.2d 709,
716-17 (1958); Town of Narragansett v. Kennelly, 83 R.I. 191, 114 A.2d
393 (1955) (by implication); New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kennelly, 81 R.I.
1, 98 A.2d 835 (1953). Contra, Jamestown v. Kennelly, 81 R.I. 177, 100
A.2d 649 (1953); New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 P.U.R.3d 195 (N.H. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1957).
119. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 232 La.
446, 94 So. 2d 431 (1957), af d in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
239 La. 175, 118 So. 2d 372 (1960); see United Gas Pipe Line Co., 38
P.U.R.3d 209, 213 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961); United Gas Pipe Line
Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 78 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960).
120. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 116 VL 206, 71 A.2d 576 (1950);
see Citizens Util. Co., 117 Vt. 285, 291, 91 A.2d 687, 691 (1952); New
Eng. Tel. &Tel. Co., 120 Vt. 181, 190-91, 136 A.2d 357, 364 (1957); New
Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 100 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960).
121. Valuation has not recently been in controversy in the Connecticut
courts and has been rarely in dispute before the Commission. But there is
judicial dictum that almost constitutes approval of original cost. Guilford-
Chester Water Co. v. Loughlin, 19 Conn. Supp. 355, 359, 113 A.2d 608,
609-10 (Sup. CL 1955); cf. Cedar Island Improvement Ass'n v. Clinton
Elec. Light & Power Co., 142 Conn. 359, 114 A.2d 535 (1955); A. Wimpf-
heimer & Bro. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 21 Conn. Supp. 69, 144 A.2d 769
(Sup. Ct. 1958). The Commission follows original cost without variation.
See, e.g., Mystic Valley Water Co., 39 P.U.R.3d 182 (Conn. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1961); Greenwich Gas Co., 38 P.U.R.3d 504 (Conn. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1961); Hartford Elec. Light Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 64 (Conn. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1960); New Canaan Water Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 188 (Conn.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960); Southern New Eng. Tel. Co., 20 P.U.R.3d 295
(Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1957); Seymour Water Co., 97 P.U.R. (n.s.)
363, 367-70 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1952) (utility offered evidence of
reproduction cost, a rare occurrence in Connecticut, but the Commission
adhered to original cost). Compare Connecticut Co., 38 P.U.R.3d 282
(Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1961) (in fixing transit fares the Commission
used the operating ratio).
122. City of Lynchburg v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 200 Va.
706, 107 S.E.2d 462 (1959) (valuation was not in issue and the Commission
used net investment as the rate base and deducted from the income);
Board of Supervisors v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 196 Va. 1102, 1117,
1121, 87 S.E.2d 139, 148, 150 (1955) (the Commission included acquisition
adjustment account and employed year-end rate base). See generally Nor-
folk v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 64 S.E.2d 772 (1951);
Board of Supervisors v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 963, 45 S.E.2d 145
(1947); Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 225, 229-30 (Va. State
Corp. Comm'n 1953) (the Commission rejected reproduction cost and fair
value in favor of original cost).
123. The Commission consistently uses original cost, but in recent pro-
ceedings has made allowance for attrition. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
36 P.U.R.3d 417 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); Cumberland &
Allegheny Gas Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 427 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960);
United Fuel Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 353 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960);
Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 132, 143 (W. Va. Pub. Serm.
Comm'n 1960); Hope Natural Gas Co., 33 P.U.R.3d 335 (W. Va. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1960).
124. See generally City Water Co., 28 P.U.R.3d 521 (Tenn. Pub. Serv.
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been passed upon by appellate courts in the period under review.
The second category embraces the Minnesota, Florida, and
Michigan enactments. Under the Minnesota act, which applies to
street railways, the state supreme court affirmed a Commission
valuation on original cost, but declared by way of dictum that
reproduction cost is an element that the Commission should give
the weight it considers proper to meet the requirements of the
act."'5 The Florida and Michigan statutes govern telephone rates;
in the former the supreme court has upheld original cost as the
rate base,126 while in the latter the appellate courts have not
passed on the issue since Hope. However, the Commission has
generally adhered to original cost in its decisions since Hope.'21
II. VALUE AND OPERATIONALISM
The basic reason for the diversity and confusion in valuation
for public utility rate-making has been the failure to define "fair
value" in operational terms. In Smyth v. Ames the Supreme Court
said:
We hold .. . that the basis of all calculations as to the reasonable-
ness of rates . . . must be the fair value of the property ....
Comm'n 1959); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 12 P.U.R.3d 170, 177
(Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
202 Tenn. 465, 304 S.W.2d 640 (1957); Inter-Mountain Tel. Co., 15
P.U.R.3d 272, 276-78 (Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1956); Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 100 P.U.R. (n.s.) 33 (Tenn. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n
1953).
125. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43,
65-73, 86 N.W.2d 657, 672-77 (1957). In issue was valuation of struc-
tures, some of which were old, others new. Since the original cost of nev
structures represented present day costs, the court said "we cannot say that
the commission acted unjustly or unreasonably in accepting book value
... of all buildings, new as well as old." Id. at 67, 86 N.W.2d at 673. In
Northern States Power Co. v. City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 489, 497, 99
N.W.2d 207, 213 (1959), the Minnesota Supreme Court said "whether
the original cost, reproduction cost, or fair value should be used as a rate
base we need not now determine." See also Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 31
P.U.R.3d 141, 150-53 (Minn. R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n 1959). See
generally MINN. STAT. § 451.07-.08 (1961) (authority to fix rates of utili-
ties, other than common carriers, is delegated to municipalities).
126. General Tel. Co., 15 Fla. Supp. 204, 115 So. 2d 554 (R.R. &
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1960). See generally Southeastern Tel. Co., 31 P.U.R.3d
233 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n 1959); Florida Tel. Co., 17 P.U.R.3d
126 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n 1956); Peninsular Tel. Co., 17 P.U.R.
3d 109 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Util. Comm'n 1956). The Commission generally
compensates for inflation by adopting a year-end rate base.
127. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 32 P.U.R.3d 395 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1960); Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 20 P.U.R.3d 397 (Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1957). Contra, General Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
341 Mich. 620, 67 N.W.2d 882 (1954) (dictum); Michigan Bell Tel. Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 Mich. 7, 50 N.W.2d 826 (1952) (by
implication).
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And in order to ascertain that value . . . [certain factors such as
original cost, replacement cost, etc.] are all matters for consideration,
and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each
case. 
1 2
8
Subsequent statutory and judicial pronouncements holding fair
value to be the rate base employ substantially the same language.
They do not include the essentials of an operational concept.
In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of op-
erations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of
operations . .. [W]e must demand that the set of operations equiv-
alent to any concept be a unique set, for otherwise there are possibili-
ties of ambiguity in practical applications which we cannot admit.' 9
It is obvious that the instruction that is the essence of "fair
value"-to give the matters for consideration (principally original
cost and reproduction cost) such weight as may be just and right-
is not operational. It offers no criterion or rule to determine what
is "just and right" and, therefore, does not provide a method to
ascertain a uniquely determinate value of the weight to be assigned
to each of the "matters for consideration" in a finding of fair
value. In practice, the weights attributed to original cost and re-
production cost in the application of the fair value concept are the
results of a purely subjective and arbitrary process, which is
characterized euphemistically as the "judgment" of the regulatory
authorities. The weights vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
from case to case within the same jurisdiction. The fact is that
fair value is an indeterminate magnitude lying anywhere between
original cost and reproduction cost.
This indeterminacy is clearly demonstrated by the findings of
fair value by those agencies committed to its use when valuation
has been in controversy. The Illinois Commission has assigned one-
quarter weight to reproduction cost and three-quarters to original
128. 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898). This definition is not merely non-
operational; it is not a correct definition in any sense. "For a term to be
correctly -defined its fully expanded definition must be a grammatically
correct sentence that contains except for the term itself only undefined
[sic] descriptive terms." BERGMANN, PHILosoPHY OF SCmNCE 50 (1957).
The Court's direction to ascertain fair value does not include the properly
defined descriptive terms that are the essentials of a correct definition; all
subsequent statutory and judicial pronouncements holding fair value to be
the rate base employ substantially the same language as quoted above and,
therefore, are definitionally defective.
129. BRHXSMAN, THE LOGIC OF MoDERN PHYSICS 5-6 (1927). Further-
more, an operational definition means that "we have to describe a set of
: . . operations, which we must carry out, in order to assign in every
individual case a uniquely determinate value to the concept." FRAN i,
PILosoPHY oF ScmcNE 52 (1957).
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cost;"' Alabama has assigned one-third to reproduction cost and
two-thirds to original cost;131 Minnesota, Delaware, Pennsyl-
vania and Arizona have given approximately equal weight to each
element.'32 North Carolina and Indiana have also attributed
equal weight to each in some proceedings, but in others have
given greater weight to original cost. 3' New Mexico, Maryland,
and New Jersey have used original cost as the principal factor
and added an increment to compensate for reproduction cost,"'
while Missouri has given "greater weight" to original cost than to
reproduction cost."5 And in Kentucky, Nebraska, and Mon-
tana, where the statutes also require fair value, no generalization
at all can be made concerning the findings of the regulatory au-
.forities."6
In the absence of an operational method for measuring fair
value, controversy in valuation proceedings is naturally stimulated
since each party to the dispute can hope to persuade the regula-
tory agency to give weight to the factors most in its interest. As
a consequence, the agency finds itself in the position of a referee
or arbitrator, and its findings of fair value usually reflect a com-
promise between exaggerated claims rather than the result of an
application of economic principles for rational rate-making.
Il. VALUE OF CAPITAL AND COST OF CAPITAL
The concern with "value" has not only produced wide diversity
in measurement of the rate base, but has also led the regulatory
authorities astray as to the correct objective of valuation. That ob-
jective is simply to state the cost of the use of capital, whereas in
"value" jurisdictions the value of capital facilities is treated as
though its measure has an intrinsic meaning and purpose. Cost of
capital-the economically appropriate and therefore necessary re-
turn to investors-may be expressed as a function of two variables,
the rate base and the rate of return. But specification of the rate
base is only a means to stating the cost of capital in a particular
way. Insistence that value (fair value) is inherently meaningful,
and must therefore serve as the rate base, ignores its purely in-
strumental role and mistakenly conceives the objective of valuation
to be the discovery of some intrinsic worth of existing property.
130. See cases cited note 82 supra.
131. See cases cited note 16 supra.
132. See cases cited notes 22, 48, 76, 79 supra.
133. See cases cited notes 17, 51, 52 supra.
134. See cases cited notes 20, 33, 85 supra.
135. See cases cited note 101 supra.
136. See cases cited notes 19, 57, 58, 83 supra.
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This misdirected concern with value in rate proceedings is
traceable directly to the statement of the Supreme Court in Smyti
v. Ames that "the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness
of rates . ..must be the fair value of the property being used
• . . for the convenience of the public"'' and to the requirement
that rates must yield a fair return on fair value." s Implicit in
this requirement is the fallacious assumption that capital invested
in a utility has for rate-making purposes a determinable objective
value and that the return due investors is some unique function
of that value. Actually, as the Kentucky Court of Appeals has ob-
served, once any reasonable measure of the invested capital or the
rate base is specified, the allowable rate of return applied to it can
be adjusted so that the numerical product of the two approximates
the appropriate return to capital. 3
From the viewpoint of economic welfare, the appropriate return
to capital in any public utility is that which is just sufficient to
attract the funds required to meet the continuing socially justified
needs of the particular utility. In economic language, this return
is the opportunity cost of capital-the highest competitive value-
product it could have created in alternative employment. °40 Op-
1ortunity cost derives from the basic principle of the rational use
of resources, which is that the assignment of a unit of resource to a
particular production process is justified only if the value of its
output in that process is no less than the value of any alternative
output foregone. Thus the sacrifice of the most valuable possible
alternative product attributable to a unit of capital is its oppor-
tunity cost. For practical purposes it is measured by the price util-
ities must pay in the money markets where they compete with oth-
er industries for investors' funds. The "end result" doctrine of
Hope is a workable approximation of the opportunity cost prin-
ciple. A return which enables a utility to maintain its financial
integrity and to attract capital is equivalent to the opportunity cost
of capital regardless of the rate base. In Hope the Court was not
concerned with the "various permissible ways in which any rate
base on which the return is computed might be arrived at."'4
But since the return is expressed as a function of a rate of return
and a rate base, some rate base is essential.
Three principal concepts compete for acceptance as the ap-
i37. 169 US. 466, 546 (1898).
138. Id. at 547.
139. Citizens-Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 247 S.W.2d 510 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1952).
140. A standard exposition of opportunity cost is found in chapter six
of STIGLFR,'THE ORY op PRica 96-100 (rev. ed. 1952).
141. 'FPC v. !ope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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propriate rate base: fair value, reproduction cost, and original cost.
Fair value is undesirable because it is a non-operational concept
and because of certain infirmities inherent in reproduction cost
that are relevant insofar as it is an ingredient in fair value. How-
ever, it is not true, as often charged, that fair value as usually em-
ployed in rate-making involves circularity.'42 Fair value must in
this respect be distinguished from exchange value, which is de-
pendent upon earnings or anticipated earnings and which thus
cannot logically serve as the basis for determination of earnings.
For example, cost to the utility of facilities previously employed is
dependent upon anticipated earnings and is inadmissible as the
rate base. But fair value is derived from "due consideration" of
original cost when first devoted to the public service and from re-
production cost, neither of which depends upon earnings. Even
though free of circularity, however, fair value is objectionable as
the rate base.
Use of reproduction cost is predicated on either or both of two
propositions: (1) utility rates should be governed by the present
or prospective cost of producing the service, including the present
or prospective cost of plant construction; (2) in a period of infla-
tion investors in utilities' securities (particularly in common stock)
should be compensated for the decline in the purchasing power of
their money income. Neither proposition is supportable on eco-
nomic grounds. Present or future costs associated with existing
plant should not properly determine product prices since the op-
erating expenses of such a plant, which in reality would not be
reproduced in view of technological progress, exceed those of a
modern efficient substitute. But the adoption for rate-making of
the estimated costs associated with a hypothetical optimum-tech-
nology plant has been consistently rejected by courts and com-
missions." 3 Although sound in economic theory,' it would in-
troduce into rate proceedings evidence even more conjectural and
controversial than estimates of the reproduction cost of existing
plant. Apart from this practical obstacle, however, the proposal
emphasizes that the operating expenses of existing plant are ex-
cessive as compared with those of a modern efficient plant, a fact
that nullifies the economic validity of using the cost of reproduc-
142. For example, the Supreme Court in Hope said: "The heart of the
matter is that rates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value' when the
value of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may
be anticipated." Id. at 601.
143. See, e.g., McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 417
(1926).
144. The cost curves used in economic analysis of price determination
necessarily assume optimum technology. See STIOLER, op. cit. supra note
140. at 141.
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ing the existing plant as a rate base while implicitly assuming con-
tinuation of current operating costs. It is illogical to relate one
category of costs (operating expenses) to current conditions and
relate another (capital cost) to future or hypothetical conditions.
Resort to reproduction cost in order to shelter investors in public
utilities' securities from the impact of inflation is both discrimina-
tory and unnecessary. It is unnecessary because the same end can
be achieved directly, without the illogical distortion of the use of
reproduction cost, by using original cost as the rate base and
simply raising the rate of return to compensate for inflation. But
in any case, investors in utilities should not be afforded this bounty,
for like other investors they assume all risks associated with their
investment, including inflation, when they purchase securities in
the open market. No economic principle is discernible to endow
them-with the special privilege of compensation for the declining
purchasing power of their money incomes-a privilege, inci-
dentally, that would be confined to owners of the utilities' common
stock only under the proposed arrangement.
The most desirable rate base is original cost when first devoted
to public service. Its qualification for this role is essentially prac-
tical, as has been frankly acknowledged by the Wisconsin Com-
mission,'45 and its advantages in this respect are obvious. Origi-
nal cost can be readily ascertained from accounting records; there-
fore it does not require conjecture and hypothetical estimation as
reproduction cost does. It has speed and efficiency in application
and does not entail the delay and costliness characteristic of pro-
ceedings involving estimates of reproduction cost, features that tend
to undermine the efficacy of rate regulation. These practical ad-
vantages alone constitute a conclusive case for original cost.
Original cost is also a more desirable rate base than reproduction
cost from the viewpoint of economic principle since it is more likely
to lead to the closest feasible approximation of the opportunity
cost of 'capital, despite having the defect, like reproduction cost,
of relating to existing plant instead of a modem efficient sub-
stitute. -At the root of the argument for reproduction cost is the as-
sumption that the price level and unit construction costs will
continue to rise and these are probable occurrences. 4 ' A rising
145. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 93 P.U.R. (n.s.) 490 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1952).
146. The claim for reproduction cost as the rate base, predicated on
the impact of inflation, differs from the claim for compensation for "attri-
tion." Attrition is usually associated with an original cost rate base. The
difference between the two can best be clarified by the following illustrations.
A. Reproduction cost. Assume that in 1961 the original cost per unit
of plant is $100 and the allowable rate of return as fixed by the regulatory
1962]
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price trend means a continuing increase in the reproduction cost
of existing plant and a greater and greater total return to investors
is necessary in order to attract funds to enable the utility to main-
tain its rate of output in the long run; so the argument goes. But
this anticipation ignores technological progress as a factor to
offset increasing prices. Such progress tends to reduce the real
cost (total real resources) of replacing existing plant even in the
absence of improvement and, at the same time, it develops new
and more efficient equipment, which permits the continued level
of output to be produced with a less costly (in terms of resource
use) set of plant facilities. Although the new plant facilities are
generally costlier than the old in monetary terms (and perhaps
even in real terms), they are also typically of greater capacity as
the economy and the scale of operation expand. Whether the cost-
reducing effects of technological innovation are more or less than
the cost rise in the prices of labor and construction material is un-
certain. The fact that estimates of reproducing existing plant make
no provision for the deflating effects of future technological im-
provements on operating costs raises at least the possibility that the
use of such estimates as a factor in determining the return to in-
vestors may lead to capital cost in excess of opportunity cost. In-
sofar as reproduction cost is used as an element in "value" or "fair
value," the same conclusion applies to these measures of the rate
base.
In contrast, original cost does appear to have furnished a safe
guide for rational resources allocation. A test of the adequacy of
the return to investors when based on original cost can be formu-
lated in the form of a question in economic terms: is the utility for
agency and actually earned is 6%. In 1962 the cost of reproducing the
identical plant is $105 per unit; the allowable rate of return is again found
at 6%, which is still being earned on a base of $100 per unit of plant. Thejustification asserted for reproduction cost as the rate base in this situation
is that $100 invested in 1961 is worth $105 in 1962 and that the investor
is entitled to a return of 6% on $105.
B. Attrition. Assume that in 1961 the original cost per unit of plant is
$100 and the allowable rate of return as fixed by the regulatory agency and
actually earned is 6%. In 1962 a new plant is installed, either as replace-
ment of a retired plant or as addition to existing plant, at a cost of $105
per unit. Then, all other things remaining the same, the actual return in
1.962 will be less than 6%; the rate of return on the new plant will drop
from 6% to 5.71% and this drop reduces the rate of return on the original
cost of the entire plant below 6%. State v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 30
N.J. 16, 27, 152 A.2d 35, 41 (1959).
The basic distinction between A and B is that in A the utility is in
1962 earning the allowable return on original cost, whereas in B it is not.
The problem in Y3 is to anticipate the increase in future investment costs
when rates are bfing prescribed in 1961 in order to avoid the initiation of
rate proceedings in 1962.
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which rates are prescribed still able to raise capital funds sufficient
to meet its needs? If it can, the use of original cost as the rate base
and of current or prospective yields on securities as the rate of re-
turn is appropriate. Experience in the original cost jurisdictions
indicates that this approximation to the opportunity cost of capital
has in fact proved adequate. A higher rate of return to investors
resulting from the use of reproduction cost would be contrary to
sound economic principle, for it would price utility services in
excess of their true opportunity cost and would thus cause the
quantities of such services produced and purchased to be less than
the proper amounts when judged in terms of consumers' welfare.
Only the actual withdrawal of investment funds as a consequence
of the use of original cost as the rate base would demonstrate that
the opportunity cost of capital is not being met. There is no evi-
dence that such inadequacy has resulted from the use of original
cost as the rate base.
CONCLUSION
The evidence reveals an extreme diversity in the application of
valuation methods for public utility rate-making. It is true that in
economic and social matters diversity generally is not necessarily
undesirable. When it results from experiment, it may bring prog-
ress. The federal system has been regarded as peculiarly suitable
for experiment since any state may serve as a laboratory without
risk to the rest of the country.'47 But diversity in the principles
and determinations of valuation has been, and continues to be,
the result of confusion. Its common underlying aberration is con-
cem for a fictitious inherent "value" of capital as an ultimate ob-
jective of discovery. Conceived in this way, as a quasi-economic
term with a vague but persistent ethical context, it is almost in-
evitably non-operational. The confusion that follows can and
should be removed by uniform legislation prescribing original
cost as the rate base with the understanding that this is simply a
first step in arriving at and expressing the true objective of rate-
making investigation-the opportunity cost of the use of capital.
147. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, ., dissenting).
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